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Insurer Intervention in Uninsured Motorist Cases
The Indiana Code requires companies which write automobile
insurance to provide their insured drivers with coverage for colli-
sions with uninsured motorists.1 When an insured motorist sues an
uninsured motorist for damages sustained in an accident, the ques-
tion arises whether the insurance company, in order to contest the
liability of the uninsured motorist, as well as the damages, may or
even must intervene as a party defendant when it receives notice
of the suit.2 Intervention, while eliminating problems of multiple
litigation over the same fact situation, can lead to substantial
1 IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976). Similar laws are in force in 47 other states. See ALA. CODE
§ 32-7-23 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(b)(3) (1978); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01
(1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4003-4006 (1966 & Supp. 1979); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2
(West Supp. 1980); COLO. Rv. STAT. § 10-4-319 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-175C
(West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 3902 (1974 & Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 41-2502 (1977);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IowA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West
Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.20-020 (Supp. 1980); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1406D (West 1978 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2902
(Supp. 1979-80); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 11D
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1977); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.49(4) (West Supp. 1979); Mss. CODE
ANN. § 83-11-101 (Supp. 1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 33-23-201 (1979); NEB. PEv. STAT. § 60-509.01 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 690B.020 (1977);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West Supp. 1979-80);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 600-626 (McKinney 1966 &
Supp. 1979-80); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-
42 (1978); OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
3636 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.789 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000
(Purdon 1971); R.L GEN. LAws § 27-7-2.1 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 38-37-10 (1976); S.D.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201 (1980); TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-21.1 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 941 (1978); VA. CODE § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 48.22.030 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(3)
(West Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 31-10-101 (1977). The two remaining states, Hawaii and
Michigan, have repealed their uninsured motorist statutes and have enacted no-fault auto-
mobile insurance.
The problem of the uninsured motorist is significant; it has been determined that approx-
imately 20% of drivers nationwide are uninsured. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
DRVER BEHAVIOR AND AccmE INVOLVEmEN. APPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIAnILITY 205-07
(1970).
2 A number of casenotes dealing with this issue appeared following a decision prohibiting
intervention in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 469 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1971). E.g., Note, 24 BAYLOR
L. REV. 436 (1972); Comment, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 182 (1970); Note, 50 Tax. L. Ray. 146
(1971); Comment, 3 Tax. TECH. L. REV. 143 (1971). Since the insurer in the underlying case
consented to be bound by any judgment against the uninsured motorist and waived its right
of subrogation and since there was no counterclaim filed, these commentaries dealt only
peripherally with the res judicata and conflict of interest issues raised in a more complicated
case.
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prejudice and conflicts of interest. A recent Indiana case, Vernon
Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Matney,s held that the com-
pany must intervene upon notice or be bound by the judgment
rendered in its absence. Although one commentator considered
this to be the last word on the subject,4 the courts of appeals in
Indiana are still split on the issue. 5
The Matney court concentrated primarily upon problems result-
ing from multiple litigation after a failure to intervene, but dealt in
very little detail with possible prejudice to the original parties and
potential conflicts of interest upon intervention. Matney treated
intervention as an all or nothing proposition, as have the other ap-
pellate decisions in Indiana and many other jurisdictions.' Yet
such rigid treatment is not mandated by the Indiana Rules of
Court.7 In light of the split between the courts of appeals and
given that the Matney decision addressed only one of the several
procedural postures of intervention, under current Indiana law it is
unclear whether there are situations where intervention is not jus-
tified and whether the judicial discretion allowed by the rules
could still be exercised in those situations to prevent intervention.
After examining the desirability of intervention in uninsured mo-
torist cases where the alleged tortfeasor fails to appear, where he
does appear and where he asserts a counterclaim against the in-
sured plaintiff, this note will suggest that the court should require
intervention when the defendant fails to appear, deny intervention
when the defendant asserts a counterclaim and use its discretion in
3 170 Ind. App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
" Mortensen, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law-Insurance, 11 IND. L. Rv.
187, 190 (1978).
1 Compare Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind. App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976)
(allowing intervention) and Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419
(1971) (allowing intervention) with Smith v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ind. App. 259, 289
N.E.2d 788 (1972) (denying intervention).
6 A majority of jurisdictions have allowed intervention. See, e.g., Matthews v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 194 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1961); Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 424, 304 So. 2d 583 (1974);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., v. Glover, 113 Ga. App. 815, 149 S.E.2d 852 (1966); Wert v.
Burke, 47 Ill. App. 2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Rawlins v. Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486
P.2d 840 (1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964);
Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85 Nev.
310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Alston v. Amalgamated Mut. Cas. Co., 53 Misc. 2d 390, 278
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1967); Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1976); Glover v. Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727 (1971). Contra, e.g., Riley v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970);
Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1964); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d
668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff'd, 469 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1971); Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355,
502 P.2d 565 (1972).
1 See notes 28-29 & accompanying text infra.
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UNINSURED MOTORISTS
all other cases through a balancing test.
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
The Indiana uninsured motorist statute requires liability insur-
ers to insure for the damages a person *is "legally entitled to re-
cover" from an uninsured motorist.8 After establishing the duty to
provide uninsured motorist coverage, the statute goes on to say
that the insurer may provide for subrogation in its policy.9 To
comply with this coverage requirement, the insurance industry has
developed standard policy terms which obligate the insurer to pay
any sums the insured is "legally entitled to recover from the unin-
sured motorist"10 subject to the requirements that the insured sup-
ply necessary information to the company and submit to a physical
examination,11 that the insured cooperate with the company," and
that the insured notify the insurer of any legal action taken against
the uninsured motorist.13
An obvious view of uninsured motorist coverage is as "substi-
tute" liability insurance for the uninsured motorist. This can be
misleading, however, in that it implies a relationship between the
uninsured motorist and the insurer which does not actually exist.
A more useful view is that uninsured motorist coverage is analo-
gous to accident insurance for accidents caused by a specific class
of tortfeasors.1 4 This emphasizes the separate nature of the in-
£ The statute provides, in part:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy or insurance insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless cov-
erage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, ... for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976). The limits presently in force in Indiana are $15,000 for injury
or death to any one person and $30,000 for injury or death to any number of persons in one
accident. Id. § 9-2-1-15.
I Id. § 27-7-5-1.
10 1966 Standard Form § I, reprinted in P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORiSTS 207 app. C
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Standard Form].
I Id. § VI B.
" Id. § VI C.
2s Id. § VI D.
14 The undertaking of the insurer more closely resembles the undertaking con-
tained in other provisions of the standard policy to pay to the insured medical
expenses suffered by him as a result of injury by automobile, although the un-
1980]
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sured's claims against the uninsured defendant and the insurer.
PROBLEMS WITH MULTIPLE LITIGATION
The victim of an accident involving an uninsured vehicle has
three options concerning potential defendants: he may sue the un-
insured motorist alone; he may sue his insurer alone; or he may
join them as co-defendants. 15 Joinder could resolve all issues in one
action, but there may be tactical reasons for avoiding this course.16
Suit against the insurer alone limits the recovery to the policy lim-
its.and would require a second action against the uninsured motor-
ist to obtain a judgment for any excess damages. Suit against the
uninsured motorist alone places no limit on the possible size of the
judgment but could still require a second action to recover from
the insurer if the uninsured motorist has insufficient assets or sub-
sequently cannot be found.
Implicit in the institution of an action by the insured against the
uninsured motorist is a failure of the insurer's settlement offer to
satisfy the claims of the insured. This could be a result either of
damages in excess of the policy limits or of disagreement about
what the insured is legally entitled to recover. Generally, the in-
surer may pay the policy limits and cease to be a factor except in
the role of subrogee plaintiff. If there is a coverage disagreement,
however, the insured may be forced, absent intervention, to main-
dertaking now in question is limited to payment of damages for bodily injuries
occasioned by a limited category of tortfeasors, namely uninsured operators
against whom the insured is "legally entitled to recover."
Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 160, 181 A.2d 634, 636 (1964).
" In Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1971), the court de-
tailed four options open to a potential plaintiff. He may file an action against his insurer
alone; he may fie an action joining the uninsured motorist and his insurer; he may file an
action against the uninsured motorist alone and notify his insurer; he may file an action
against the uninsured motorist alone and not notify his insurer. The court indicated that
the insurer would unquestionably be bound by a judgment under the first two options and
would not be bound by a judgment under the fourth. Id. at 319, 265 N.E.2d at 433. A few
states require the claimant to proceed initially against the alleged tortfeasor as a condition
precedent to uninsured motorist indemnification. See generally A. Winiss, A GUDE TO UN-
INSURED MOTORIST COVERAGR § 7.16 (Supp. 1980).
If the insured sues his insurer alone, the insurer may be able to require joinder of the
uninsured motorist under the terms of the insurance policy. 1966 Standard Form, supra
note 10, § VI C; see American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind. App. 99, 102, 278 N.E.2d
295, 298 (1972) (affirming the insurer's right "to bring in as parties the uninsured motorist
and his principal"). It has been held, however, that such joinder may not be used to defeat
the jurisdiction of the court. Puckett v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 477 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Ky.
App. 1971).
6 See, e.g., notes 37-42 & accompanying text. infra.
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tain a suit against his own insurer to collect a judgment against the
uninsured motorist.
If the insurer does not intervene and is not required to do so, it
will not be a party to, or in privity with, a party to the initial ac-
tion.17 Consequently, any judgment rendered cannot be binding on
the insurer since it has not had its "day in court."1 Thus, if the
insurer refuses to pay, the insured will be forced to start an action
against his insurer and relitigate the issues of liability and
damages.19
In such a case, when the insured must litigate the same facts
twice to obtain a recovery, the effects of stare decisis tend to foster
consistent results: the first case will be fairly strong legal precedent
for judicial decisions in the second.2 0 The passage of time may also
make the evidence stale and cause witnesses to rely on the decision
in the prior action in framing their testimony.21 Even though two
trials are thus likely to produce the same result, they waste the
court's time, waste the litigants' time and add expense.2 2 There re-
17 Smith v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ind. App. 259, 269, 289 N.E.2d 788, 793 (1972);
Mayhew v. Deister, 144 Ind. App. 111, 121, 244 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1969); see RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF JuDrmErs § 78(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
18 See Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. App. 297, 327, 265 N.E.2d 419, 438 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion) & cases cited therein. In Noble the insurer was asked to join in the in-
sured's action against the uninsured motorist, but it denied coverage and did not join. The
court held that since the insurer had the right to intervene and was fully advised of the suit,
there was no good reason to put the burden on the insured plaintiff to relitigate his case
against the insurer. Id. at 320, 265 N.E.2d at 434 (majority opinion). Hence, the judgment
against the uninsured defendant was binding on the insurer. The dissent argued that the
insurer could not be bound because it was not a party or in privity with a party to the suit
and that ethical considerations compelled a contrary result. Id. at 328, 265 N.E.2d at 438
(dissenting opinion).
1, A mitigating factor in favor of the insured who wins his first action is the potential
liability of the insurer for punitive damages for a bad faith failure to pay the claim. The
remedy of punitive damages has been extended to uninsured motorist cases in California,
Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1972), and the specter of a large punitive damage award would probably make a second suit
against the insurer unnecessary in many instances. See generally Levit, Punitive Damages
Extended to Uninsured Motorist Provision, 1972 INs. L.J. 514. The actual effect of Rich-
ardson on the problems of multiple litigation is difficult to ascertain since the doctrine it
announces applies only to California and represents a major judicial step for any state to
take. The doctrine has not been adopted in many states and has been expressly rejected by
one court. Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App. 1973). A federal appellate
court sitting in a diversity action, however, has decided that the doctrine applies in Indiana.
Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978).
20 See Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 554 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 From filing to termination the majority of motor vehicle accident cases require more
than two years to resolve. FEDERAL JUDIcIAL CENTz, U.S. DEPIT OF TRANsPORTATION, AuTo-
MOBILE AccmENT LMGATION 8 (1970). Some may continue as long as eight years. Id.
2 In 1968 the approximate average cost per trial was $4,200 in state court and $7,800 in
1980]
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mains the possibility that the results could be inconsistent. The
many issues present in a determination of liability and damages in
the typical automobile accident case increase the chances of incon-
sistency2 s as every jury is different in its approach to a case. Also,
the healing effect of time and imbalances in resources of the liti-
gants could lead to inconsistency. In addition to undermining pub-
lic confidence in the judicial system, inconsistent results allow the
insurer and the insured to pick and choose among judgments for
one to their liking, and breed confusion about the plaintiff's right
to recover.24
INTERVENTION
Intervention by the insurer provides a procedural answer to the
problem of multiple litigation. When the insurer successfully inter-
venes it occupies a position identical to that of an original defen-
dant to the action.2 5 Hence, both the insurer and the uninsured are
motivated to defeat a recovery by the insured.
Two bases for intervention exist in the rules. The first is inter-
vention as a matter of right. Intervention must be permitted under
an unconditional statutory right or
when the applicant claims an interest relating to a property
fund, or transaction, which is the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practi-
cal matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest
in the property, fund, or transaction, unless the applicant's in-
terest is adequately represented by existing parties.26
This basis for intervention is grounded in due process; since there
would be a fundamental unfairness in allowing outside interests to
be adversely affected without allowing a defense of those interests,
intervention is allowed.2 7
The second basis for intervention is permissive. Intervention
may be permitted under a conditional statutory right or "when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
federal court. Id. at 44.
" One treatise devotes four of its fifteen volumes to issues which can arise in an automo-
bile accident case. See D. BLAsHFmLD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTomOMLE LAW & PRACTICE (3d ed.
1965).
24 Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind. App. 45, 50, 351 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1976).
" See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACIcE 24.16[4], at 24-631 (2d ed. 1948).
" IND. R. CT. 24(a)(2).
27 See Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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law or fact in common."2 s This type of intervention depends on
judicial discretion and is inherently more flexible than intervention
as a matter of right. The rule sets a standard for the exercise of
this discretion. "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudi-
cation of the rights of the original parties."29
No matter which of these bases is invoked, intervention on the
part of the insurer following notification of an uninsured motorist
claim puts the insured in an adversary position with respect to his
own insurer. In general, he must prove that his fact situation
comes within the terms of his uninsured motorist coverage in order
to recover.
The first item to be proven is the uninsured status of the de-
fendant. Some courts, however, consider this a prerequisite to in-
tervention and may insist that the insurer stipulate that the de-
fendant is uninsured.30 Such a position is not sound because it
forces the insurer either to abandon any contract defense on this
point or abandon its chance to intervene. If the defendant is later
shown to be uninsured it may be too late to intervene on the negli-
gence issue. A better view is that the insurer's interests may be
sufficiently in jeopardy to qualify it for intervention as a result of
the notification process undertaken by the insured.3 1 Alternatively,
the court could determine at the outset of the case whether the
defendant motorist is uninsured.32 Since the uninsured status of
INn. R. CT. 24(b)(2).
2* Id.
' For example, a Missouri appellate court has taken a narrow view of the interest neces-
sary for intervention:
The petitioner for intervention must have an "interest" in the subject matter
of the action. Such interest does not include a mere, consequential, remote or
conjectural possibility of being in some manner affected by the result of the
original action. It must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the
judgment to be rendered.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). In Smith
v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ind. App. 259, 289 N.E.2d 788 (1972), the court stressed that
the uninsured status of the tortfeasor had not been pleaded so it could not be established
that the insurer would have a definite interest in the outcome. This led in part to a denial of
the right to intervene. Id. at 268, 289 N.E.2d at 793.
3' In Rawlins v. Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971), the insurer was notified by
letter of the insured's intent to file suit but received no copy of the summons. See note 13 &
accompanying text supra. The court allowed the intervention, observing that "by failing to
intervene after receiving notice of the pendency of such an action a carrier ... subjects
itself to a distinct and real hazard that it might be ... bound." Id. at 569, 486 P.2d at 844.
" See Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill. App. 2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964) (intervention allowed on
the condition that lack of insurance be established or submitted to the court for determina-
1980]
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the negligent motorist is a condition of the insured's recovery on
his insurance contract, the burden of proof on this issue is on the
insured.33 Such proof of a negative-lack of insurance-is easy if
the defendant appears and can testify, but it can become ex-
tremely difficult where the defendant defaults.3
The second item to be proven is that all conditions precedent to
recovery on the insurance contract have been satisfied.35 In many
cases this will probably not be an issue, but where it is, the addi-
tion of these extra questions could confuse the jury. The opinion in
Vernon Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Matney36 was unclear
as to whether such issues could be raised in the trial of the neg-
ligence action. It held that the insurer may have "a full and
complete adjudication of all the issues at a single trial," without
discussing whether that included the coverage issues. More impor-
tantly, these issues definitely inject the notion of insurance into
the case.87 In the context of a voluntary intervention, the insurer
might be held to waive protection against the effect of insurance
tion prior to trial of the main issues).
Although there are no Indiana cases on point, the general rule seems to be that in an
uninsured motorist case, the burden is on the insured claimant to prove that the tortfeasor
was uninsured. Olenick v. Governmental Employees Ins. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 764, 328 N.Y.S.2d
50 (1971), modified on other grounds, 42 App. Div. 2d 760, 346 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1973). The
uninsured status of the offending motorist has been characterized as a condition precedent
to recovery, and as such the insured has the burden of proving that status. Talazac v. Pheo-
nix of Hartford Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 636 (La. Ct. App. 1972). From a policy standpoint this is
probably unwise in that it forces the claimant to prove a negative, the lack of insurance, and
puts the burden on the party with the inferior resources. A better course would be to estab-
lish a presumption of no insurance in an uninsured motorist case which the insurance com-
pany could rebut with affirmative evidence.
I" Various methods to prove the uninsured status of an absent defendant have been tried
unsuccessfully. It has been held that a default judgment in another state against the motor-
ist does not prove he was uninsured, Ross v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 13 Misc. 2d 739, 173
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1958), that the testimony of an attorney as to declarations by the motorist
and the results of sending letters to the motorist is insufficient, Levy v. American Auto. Ins.
Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961), and that a declaration by the motorist that
he did not have insurance coverage is not evidence that the vehicle was uninsured, South-
western Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Miller, 254 Ark. 387, 493 S.W.2d 432 (1973). Plaintiffs have
also tried to evade the hearsay rule and introduce statements by the offending motorist
made at the scene of the accident by claiming that they were part of the res gestae of the
accident, but this approach has met with limited success. See Talazac v. Phoenix of Hart-
ford Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 636 (La. Ct. App. 1972). See generally Ryan, The Uninsured
Motorist: How Proved? And by Whom?, Ky. BE.NCH & B., April, 1978, at 16.
1 See, e.g., Universal Ins. Co. v. Glover, 100 Ind. App. 327, 195 N.E. 583 (1935) (condi-
tions precedent must be proven in an action on an automobile fire insurance policy).
170 Ind. App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
37 See Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 424, 304 So. 2d 583 (1974); A. Wmiss, supra note 15,
§ 7.23. But see Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
Omio ST. L.J. 158, 171 (1958) (concludes that the effect is negligible).
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on the jury. Where the intervention is forced or where the verdict
might exceed the policy limits, the prejudice to the insurer or to
the original defendant flowing from jury knowledge of insurance
coverage could be severe."
The final item to be proven is that the insured is legally entitled
to recover from the uninsured motorist. Obviously, the proof of
this condition of the insurance contract will coincide with the
plaintiff's negligence case against the uninsured motorist. This
dual role for plaintiff's case can create conflicts which would
prejudice the positions of the original parties. The potential for
such prejudice may motivate the parties to protest the intervention
and should be taken into account by the court.
OBJECTIONS TO INTERVENTION BY THE PARTIES
The Insured
The practical impact of intervention in the uninsured motorist
case is that the insurer contributes resources and expertise to the
defense of the uninsured motorist in an attempt to defeat the in-
terests of its own insured. Thus, the insurer forsakes its former cli-
ent from whom it has received premium payments. In addition to
feeling some chagrin about this, the insured may have cause for
complaint about the results of the intervention.
Shortly after the accident the insured must furnish the insurer
with full details and submit to a physical examination if re-
quested.89 Thus, the insurer may possess a considerable body of
information about the accident which the insured may wish it did
not have in the event a lawsuit is later brought against the unin-
sured.40 Of course, the liberality of discovery would make much of
this available anyway,4 1 and anything damaging to the insured in
the initial report would not be admissible at trial.42 Even the inad-
" The prejudice is similar to that which motivates courts to make the presence of liability
insurance irrelevant to a determination of liability and damages in a negligence case. See C.
McCoRmiCK, McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 201 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
$1 1966 Standard Form, supra note 10, § VI B.
40 Some of this information may even be in the form of a sworn statement which the
insurer can require the insured to make. Id.
41 See generally Pace, Some Problems Which Arise When an Insurer Has Coverage on
Both Parties to an Accident, 1967 INs. L.J. 532.
4' The rationale for making this information inadmissible is that admitting it would tend
to discourage full disclosure by the insured to the insurer. Id. at 536. In People v. Ryan, 30
1980]
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missible information, however, could create a tactical courtroom
advantage for the insurer.4' Along this same line, the information
could have an extrajudicial effect on the conduct of settlement ne-
gotiations. If the insurer is aware of all of the weaknesses in the
insured's case, it could dramatically decrease the chances of the
insured to obtain a favorable settlement.44
The insured may also have cause to complain about the extra
litigation resources arrayed against him at trial. Particularly in a
case where expert witnesses become a factor, the addition of "deep
pockets" to the defense side could influence the result. In addition,
if the jurisdiction were to limit the number of experts each party
could call, the defense allotment would be increased by
intervention.
The Uninsured
The uninsured defendant could have some complaint with the
results of intervention as well. He may simply not want interfer-
ence in his defense. More seriously, the insurer may actually work
against his interests. Typically, uninsured motorist coverage is cou-
Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964), the trial court had ordered production of a statement
made to the defendant's insurer prior to her prosecution for driving under the influence.
The Illinois Supreme Court held the statement to be privileged on the grounds that "the
insured may properly assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for
the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of
the insured." Id. at 461, 197 N.E.2d at 17. The public policy preference for full disclosure
would seem to outweigh any interest of the insurer in admitting information from the initial
report.
"1 The situation is analogous to that created when an attorney's work product is discover-
able. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Supreme Court prohibited discovery of
statements gathered by an attorney where opposing counsel wanted them to prepare himself
to examine witnesses. This doctrine was extended to include statements made to a private
investigator in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Possession by an insurer of
intimate knowledge about its insured's case could give the insurer an immeasurable advan-
tage in the cross-examination of witnesses and the structuring of the defense.
"I The question of settlement is significant- statistics indicate 87% of automobile accident
cases are terminated prior to trial and only 7% reach final judgment. FEDERAL JUDMIAL
CENER, supra note 21, at 8. It also appears that the earlier an insured settles the smaller
his recovery will be in relation to his economic loss. 1 DEP'T oP TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMo-
BILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAiMs 67 (1970). Knowledge on the part of the insurer of the weak-
nesses in the insured's case allows the insurer to hold out longer since there is less uncer-
tainty to spur a high settlement.
Although settlement is a desirable goal, it should not be promoted at the expense of the
insured's interests. The Seventh Circuit has held that "under Indiana law an insurer who
attempts to force its insured to settle an uninsured motorist claim for less than the amount
claimed, although aware that it is liable for the full amount, breaches its duty of good
faith." Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 1978).
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pled with other independent types of insurance such as medical
coverage.45-If the insured recovers nothing from the uninsured, a
loss will still be borne by the insurer. Since the Indiana uninsured
motorist statute allows the insurer that pays an uninsured motorist
claim to be subrogated to the insured's right to collect from the
uninsured,4 it may be to the insurer's advantage for the uninsured
defendant to be found liable if he has any available assets. Thus, a
conflict of interest may exist between the insurer and the unin-
sured who thinks he is getting the advantage of the intervention
defense.
This right of subrogation also creates a difficult situation for the
uninsured who has availed himself of a defense offered by the in-
surer. Since the insurer is not a liability carrier for the uninsured,
there is no duty of cooperation. If the uninsured does not cooper-
ate with the insurer, he loses the benefit of the insurer's resources
and assistance. If he does cooperate, he runs the risk that the in-
formation and help he provides could be used against him later.
The effect of this upon a knowledgeable uninsured will be to cause
strain between him and the insurer during the trial and decrease
the potential ability of intervention to protect the insurer's inter-
ests. The effect upon an ignorant uninsured will be to put him at
the mercy of the insurer.
The Insurer
Where the insurer has intervened and the uninsured has filed a
counterclaim against the insured, a serious conflict of interest
arises which may be objectionable to all parties. Uninsured motor-
ist coverage is an appendage to liability insurance.4' By the terms
of the standard liability policy, the insurer must provide a defense
to its insured against liability claims covered by the policy.49 This
is beneficial to both parties since it allows the insurer to control
the defense of a claim on which it may ultimately be liable and it
gives the insured a defense financed out of company funds. How-
ever, when the insurer has intervened on behalf of the uninsured
defendant and is bound by contract to defend a counterclaim as-
serted by that defendant against the insured plaintiff, an obvious
" See J. DONALDSON, CASUALTY CLAIM PRACTICE § 1617 (1969).
49 IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976).
47 See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
" See note 8 supra.
4" See J. DONALDSON, supra note 45, § 1604.
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conflict of interest results.50 The insurer will want both parties to
be found negligent because such a result would bar recovery by
either party and afford the insurer complete protection on both its
liability and uninsured motorist exposures.5'
Several solutions to this conflict could be proposed although
none is entirely satisfactory. Perhaps the simplest, suggested by
American Bar Association guidelines,52 is disclosure of the conflict
to the parties. Although disclosure is certainly desirable, it hardly
seems sufficient in light of the potential for the insurer to control
both sides of the litigation. Alternatively, the insurer could employ
separate counsel to represent the two positions,53 but the question
of how much control the insurer will exert still must be resolved.
At least in the case of the liability (counterclaim) defense, the in-
surer will normally direct all aspects of the defense including set-
50 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff'd, 469
S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1971). See generally P. PRETZEL, supra note 10, at 143; A. Wmiss, supra
note 15, § 7.21.
51 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff'd, 469 S.W.2d
151 (Tex. 1971).
2 ABA News Release, National Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers § V (De-
cember 1, 1969), reprinted in P. PRgrzEL, supra note 10, at 245 app. These were approved
by the American Bar Association House of Delegates on February 7, 1972. 97 REPORTS OF
THE ABA 706 (1975). An attorney placed in such a potential conflict of interest position
might have serious concerns about his ability to "preserve the confidences and secrets of
[the] client," ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBLrrY, Canon 4, and to "exercise inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of [the] client, id., Canon 5. The attorney will be
representing divergent interests no matter which party he is affiliated with since the insurer
hired him initially. Although full disclosure of the conflict and consent to such representa-
tion by the client can obviate the problem in many instances, this is generally not true in
litigation. See id. E.C. 5-15.
Of course, in many cases there will not be a formal conflict but rather a desire on the part
of the attorney to maintain a good business relationship with the insurance company. The
effect could be the same as if a formal conflict existed, however.
53 Under the proposed ethics rules of the American Bar Association, this course may be
mandatory. The comments to Rule 1.8 on conflicts in litigation indicate: "The question of
separate representation should not necessarily depend on the fact that one of the parties is
paying for the representation, for example where conflict of interest arises between a liabil-
ity insurer and its insured. Separate representation may be required in such situations."
Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8, Comment, re-
printed in 48 U.S.L.W. (February 19, 1980) at 7. This prohibition is extended to participa-
tion in settlement negotiations as well:
[U]nder no circumstances could a lawyer properly ... represent parties to a
negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other.
When it is plain that prejudice to the client's interests is likely to result, the
lawyer should not undertake the representation even with the consent of the




tlement negotiations." Such complete decisionmaking power could
render the use of separate counsel inadequate to avoid the conflict.
The situation is similar in many respects to that where one in-
surer covers both parties to an accident.5 5 If the insurer simply
fails to provide a defense to its insured, it is denied the chance to
protect its interests, and the insured loses the benefits of a defense
for which he contracted and paid premiums. It has been suggested
that the insured be allowed to employ independent counsel at the
insurer's expense;58 however, the insurer still loses some of its deci-
sionmaking authority and will definitely want a right of approval
on the independent counsel employed. There is also some question
about whether the insurer can be held liable for the costs of the
independent counsel.57 The basic difficulty seems to be a reluc-
tance on the part of the courts to reform the contract of insurance
when there is no statutory basis for awarding costs of independent
counsel.5 8
THE NEED FOR A FLEXIBLE PROCEDURE
In light of the possibilities for prejudice to the original parties as
well as conflicts of interest for the insurer, there are circumstances
where intervention is not desirable. Further, the possibility that
intervention will add contractual issues to what began as a negli-
gence action can create confusion about the proper scope of inter-
vention if it is allowed. These conflicts and uncertainties about the
See J. DONALDSON, supra note 45, § 1605.
" See generally Pace, supra note 41.
"Id. at 540.
57 Compare O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946) (allowing fees on the
basis that public policy does not allow a conflict of interest but also does not favor a forfei-
ture of the defense provision in an insurance contract) with Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21
Misc. 2d 583, 188 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1959) (denying fees on the basis of a refusal to "rewrite"
the insurance contract). Both of these cases involved a plaintiff and defendant insured by
the same company where separate attorneys had been hired for each side.
" See Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21 Misc. 2d 583, 188 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1959). This issue
has been considered in another context in All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
160 (N.D. Ind. 1971). The insurer had issued a liability policy in which it was bound to
defend the tavern in question on a suit arising from injuries to a customer. The insurer
claimed the injuries were intentionally inflicted. This contradicted the story of the tavern
owner and created a conflict of interest. The court said:
There is no reason to handle this situation any differently than the usual
situation where the insurer has a conflict of interest. The insurer must either
provide an independent attorney to represent the insured, or pay for the cost




permissibility and scope of intervention are reflected in the inabil-
ity of the courts to agree on the intervention question. 9 Since
blanket solutions either requiring or denying intervention in all
cases do not eliminate the potential for prejudice and conflicts of
interest, a more flexible response is called for. The desired flex-
ibility can be achieved by utilizing the judicial discretion built into
the permissive intervention rules.
Discretion is often exercised to address problems associated with
analogous issues such as joinder. The Indiana Rules of Court pro-
vide a number of opportunities for the court to weigh potential
prejudice against the problems of multiple litigation. When consid-
ering questions of joinder60 or whether to sever claims or issues for
separate trial,' the court must exercise its discretion in this man-
ner. Further, the discretion built into intervention has been used
in other contexts,62 so it seems incongruous to remove discretion in
uninsured motorist cases as the court did in Matney.6 3 The rule
contemplates that cases will vary significantly in the strength of
their arguments for and against intervention; attempts to deny this
by removing the court's discretion sacrifice justice for formalism.
STANDARDS FOR AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
Any scheme for approaching the intervention question from a
flexible perspective must suggest appropriate judicial responses for
cases where the defendant fails to appear, where he appears and
asserts a counterclaim, and where he appears and simply defends
the action. The first step in such a scheme, however, is to bring the
question before the court, and to that end an insurer properly noti-
fied of a pending uninsured motorist action should be required to
file an intervention petition in the appropriate court or suffer a
waiver of its right to contest the liability of the uninsured motorist
and the determination of damages.6 Whether this petition is
", See notes 5-6 & accompanying text supra.
60 IND. R. CT. 19(b).
" IND. R. CT. 42.
61 See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978) (postal
service suit); Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973) (school desegregation suit); Car-
mona v. Ward, 416 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (drug offense suit); Chalmers v. United
States, 43 F.R.D. 286 (D. Kan. 1967) (estate tax refund suit). See generally 3B J. MooRE
FEa.RA.L PRACTICE 24.10[2] (2d ed. 1948) & cases cited therein.
" Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind. App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
" A similar result could be achieved by requiring the insured plaintiff to join his insurer
in the original suit as a defendant. Such coerced joinder, which would presumably be accom-
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granted must depend first on whether the uninsured motorist ap-
pears to defend.
If no appearance is entered by the uninsured motorist and a de-
fault is imminent, the insurer's petition should be granted. This
will result in the equivalent of a suit by the insured against his
insurer alone, and all issues, both contractual and tort-related, may
be litigated together. The only possible objection to intervention
concerns the information that the insured has provided to his in-
surer prior to intervention, but any such prejudice would occur
anyway if the insured sought to collect a default judgment from
the insurer in a second suit. If there are no contractual defenses
involved in the case, the presence of the insurance company could
even be hidden from the jury by allowing the insurer to defend in
the name of the uninsured motorist. Granting the petition to inter-
vene is the most efficient use of judicial resources since a second
trial would be necessary after a default judgment were intervention
to be denied.
If the uninsured defendant does appear, whether the court per-
mits intervention should depend first on whether the defendant
counterclaims. When the defendant asserts a counterclaim, the pe-
tition to intervene should be denied. The insurer faces a serious
conflict of interest problem in this situation as to which side of the
case it will control. Indeed, the insurer will probably be reluctant
to involve itself for fear of a charge of bad faith,6 5 and the insurer's
counsel may be concerned over potential disciplinary action.68
Even in the case where separate attorneys can be employed to han-
dle the two sides of the litigation, the original parties will object to
the free flow of information which must accompany the insurer's
investigation of both the uninsured motorist claim and the coun-
terclaim.67 The court could eliminate the conflict by severing the
claim and counterclaim, 8 but this would lead to two trials. Thus,
intervention would not prevent multiple litigation. Since two trials
plished under IND. R. CT. 19(a), has the disadvantage that a decision by the insurer to stay
out of the case and waive its right to contest liability and damages becomes more difficult to
effect. A further difficulty is the lack of an effective sanction for failure to join. Dismissal
seems too harsh if it were done with prejudice and would waste time if it were done without
prejudice. The court could merely join the insurer on its own motion, but this places a
burden on the court to remember this in the situation where neither original party wants
the insurer in the case.
"See note 19 supra.
" See note 52 supra.
,See notes 39-44 & accompanying text supra.
INm. R. CT. 42(b).
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will be necessary, it is better to avoid the adverse effects of inter-
vention on the original parties by denying intervention and, thus,
allowing the insurer to concentrate on defending the counterclaim
in the first action.69
Although a counterclaim should normally preclude insurer inter-
vention, the counterclaim could be for a much lower sum than the
uninsured motorist claim, and a form of conditional intervention
could then be allowed if all parties assented and the court in the
exercise of its discretion decided it should be allowed. The mini-
mum conditions for allowing the intervention should be: (1) con-
sent by the insurer to be bound by the judgments rendered in both
the claim and the counterclaim; (2) consent by the insurer to relin-
quish its right to defend the counterclaim; and (3) consent by the
insurer to pay reasonable attorney's fees to provide the insured
with an independent counterclaim defense. 0
A third procedural possibility is an appearance by the defendant
but no counterclaim. When the uninsured defendant appears but
asserts no counterclaim, the court should adopt a balancing test to
decide whether to permit intervention. The interests to be bal-
anced are avoidance of multiple litigation and prejudice to the par-
ties. At a hearing on the intervention motion7 1 the original parties
could object to the intervention on the ground that they will suffer
prejudice. As a practical matter these objections will be sufficient
to deny intervention under the rule 24 test of "[undue] delay or
prejudice [to] the adjudication of the rights of the original par-
ties"72 only when they involve damaging information about the in-
sured known to the insurer73 or when they involve a risk of sub-
stantial conflict of interest in the relationship between the insurer
and the uninsured defendant.74
Objections relating to an imbalance of resources or the use of
experts can be avoided by judicial control over the proceedings and
"9 There is a chance that the second trial will be unnecessary if the insured wins the first
trial as the insurer may decide to settle the insured's claim. See note 19 supra. If the claim
and counterclaim are severed instead, it is much more likely that two trials will occur.
7o There would seem to be nothing wrong in allowing the insurer a right of approval of
the independent counsel chosen to protect itself from collusion or incompetence. Of course,
a limited requirement of good faith would be necessary so the insurer would not hold out for
the counsel of its choice.
71 Such hearings are permitted by IND. R. CT. 73.
7' IND. R. CT. 24(b).
" See notes 39-44 & accompanying text supra.
74 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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the use of an appropriate pre-trial order.75 Where there are con-
tractual issues which the insurer wishes to raise, the court may de-
cide that a bifurcation of the trial or even a complete separation
into two trials is warranted." Such a severance would avoid jury
confusion and the injection of insurance into the case. 7
The timing and effect of the decisions to be made in the forego-
ing procedure are best illustrated by a hypothetical example. A, an
insured driver, is involved in an accident with B, an uninsured
driver. A sues B and, pursuant to the terms of his insurance
policy,78 A sends a copy of the complaint and summons to I, his
insurer. At this point I must decide (1) whether it is convinced
that B is uninsured; (2) whether A has performed all of the condi-
tions of his insurance contract; and (3) whether A is legally en-
titled to recover damages from B. If I decides all of these questions
in the affirmative, I will settle the claim with A and can proceed
against B by right of subrogation. If I does not settle, it must de-
cide whether to waive its chance to contest B's liability and the
amount of damages by failing to intervene.
Assuming I petitions to intervene, the court should set a hearing
on the petition to take place after the time to answer the original
complaint has run.79 At this hearing A and B (if he appears) can
contest the intervention. Here the court must undertake the bal-
ancing analysis unless B defaults or asserts a counterclaim; then
the court must determine the scope and conditions of intervention
if it is permitted. 80
75 See, e.g., Barry v. Keith, 474 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1971). The court allowed intervention on
a set of conditions, one of which allowed the trial judge to impose whatever controls he
believed reasonably necessary to insure a fair and orderly trial. Id. at 878. See generally
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
HAnv. L. Rav. 721, 761 (1968).
7, Severance is permitted under Iw. R. CT. 42(b).
7 Alternatively, the effect of insurance on the jury might be counteracted by instructing
the jury that the insurer will be subrogated as against the uninsured defendant. This would
tend to lower the verdict where the fact of insurance would tend to raise it. See note 37
supra. This is analogous to allowing a defendant to testify that he has no liability insurance
after the plaintiff has suggested the contrary to the jury. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38,
at 481.
71 See text at note 13 supra.
1, This period is generally 20 days after the complaint was filed. IND. R. CT. 12(a).
Whether a petition to intervene filed after this point is sufficiently timely to be allowed
under I,. R. CT. 24 must turn on whether the original parties have suffered any prejudice
by the delay and whether the insurer has waived its right to intervene by the delay. See
Rawlins v. Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971).
" If prejudice or a conflict of interest were to appear at a later stage of the trial after
intervention had been permitted, under IND. R. CT. 41(a)(2) a judge could always dismiss




In the face of competing evils of multiple litigation and conflict
of interest, the potential injustice of a rule requiring insurer inter-
vention in every uninsured motorist case81 is not justified by its
simplicity. When the victim of an automobile accident elects to sue
an uninsured motorist alone, he raises fundamental questions of
cost and fairness. It is nearly axiomatic that the victim's insurance
company cannot be bound by the judgment if it is not involved.
Forcing the insurance company into the case through intervention
can allow all issues to be resolved neatly in one trial and avoids the
expense, delay, and possible inconsistency of two trials. This justi-
fication for intervention may be outweighed, however, by the po-
tential for prejudice to the parties when the insurer is brought in.
The adversary posture of the insured and his insurer where once
there was cooperation can put the insured at a disadvantage. The
uninsured defendant may object to interference in his defense and
the injection of insurance into the case which necessarily accom-
panies intervention. If a counterclaim is filed, the insurer is placed
into a direct conflict of interest in its competing roles as defendant
in the claim and defender in the counterclaim. Pervading the en-
tire intervention question is the potential for jury confusion result-
ing from an extra party and extra issues.
It is the duty of the courts to adopt a more flexible approach
which accounts for the competing interests of these different situa-
tions. Intervention should be required when the defendant fails to
appear and prohibited when the defendant asserts a counterclaim.
In all other cases the court should balance the desirability of inter-
vention against its cost in prejudice to the parties. Only in this way
can the benefits of intervention be obtained without a sacrifice of
justice.
ALAN W. BECKER
could sever the trials of the two defendants to avoid prejudice.
11 E.g., Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind. App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
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